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Abstract—European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)
is the European reference for interoperable and safer signaling
systems to efficiently manage trains running. If implemented, it
allows trains cross seamlessly intra-European national borders.
ERTMS has defined a secure communication protocol, EURO-
RADIO, based on open communication networks. Its RadioInfill
function can improve the reaction of the signaling system to
changes in line conditions, avoiding unnecessary braking: its
advantages in terms of power saving and travel time has been
analyzed.
In this paper a software implementation of the EURORADIO
protocol with RadioInfill for ERTMS Level 1 using GSM-R
is illustrated as part of the SR-Secure Italian project. In this
building-blocks architecture the EURORADIO layers communi-
cates together through modular Application Programm Interfaces.
Security coding rules and railway industry requirements specified
by EN 50128 standard have been respected. The proposed
implementation has successfully passed conformity tests and has
been tested on a computer-based simulator.
Index Terms—ERTMS, ETCS signaling, EURORADIO proto-
col, RadioInfill funtion.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY and optimization of trains circulation are keyissues for traffic railways management systems. Complex
technology architectures, Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
systems, are set to automatically control trains running, to
recover and avoid human errors and to prevent trains collisions
in normal situation and when circulation or routes status are
changed. ATP are based on trackside equipments, installed
along the railway, that monitor routes conditions and trains
circulations, collect and send the related information to the
trainborne system using different technologies. At its turn
the onboard train equipment elaborates these data and makes
those available to the driver (cab signaling). ATP integrates
the pre-existent signaling systems with information points,
distributed along the route in positions important for train
circulation management, that have the function of protection on
the circulation. They can be distinguished in fixed information
points sending constant data such as speed limits, accelera-
tion line slope, and variable information points, transmitting
dynamic signaling data associated with the preexistent light
signals. Thus, when the train is transiting in proximity of
these beacons, see Fig. 1, its trainborne subsystem picks up
the information on train circulation sent as telegrams from
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Figure 1. Example of ATP system.
the trackside system and displays that to the train driver. In
general, in order to alert the driver to modify the train speed
and to avoid abrupt speed changes, a further "notice" beacon is
located around 1200 m before the protection information point,
see Figure 1. Thus, when the driver sees the notice beacons
as yellow, which corresponds to a red protection beacon, it
adopts a deceleration curve suitable to brake and stop the train
when crossing the related protection beacon. If this profile and
the allowed maximum speed are not respected, the automatic
braking system is activated. However, if the speed change
is no more needed, due to a sudden modification of route
condition, and the protection point becomes green again, these
ATP systems are not so reactive to enable the driver to modify
the speed curve and to come back to the previous one. Indeed,
the trainborne subsystem cannot exchange its configuration
until the next information beacon is reached. This means that,
even when it is no more necessary, the process of deceleration
has to be extended until the next information point, otherwise
automatic braking system stops the train, and only after this
beacon the train can accelerate again and recover the original
speed. Accordingly the train running can be discontinuous,
with a stop-and-go behavior that makes traffic circulation
irregular and not optimized. This impacts also on power saving,
increasing power consumption, on wear of the brakes, on the
noise, and on passenger comfort, travel time, and delays. Thus
an improved signaling system, more reactive to the variability
of the railway network conditions, is necessary. Moreover, as
far as international trains are concerned, it is required that
the signaling system is interoperable with different national
equipments.
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) [1]–
[10] is an advanced version of ATP about signalling, control
and train protection, set by European Union as the reference for
European interoperable railways signaling. ERTMS is regulated
by Directive 96/48/EC [11] that has specified standards,
procedures and technologies, and Directive 2001/16/EC [12]
about the interoperability of the trans-European conventional
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common to all European nations in order to make the rail traffic
circulation seamless and safer when crossing different national
boundaries. Indeed, each European country has its national ATP,
almost twenty in Europe [2]: for instance, INDUSI system,
based on inductive beacons, is adopted in Germany, ASFA/LZB
in Spain, AWS in UK. In Italy the national railway company,
RFI, has developed two different ATP systems [7], both of them
based on discontinuous communication: SCMT [13], the most
compatible with ERTMS, distributed along the most important
routes, and SSC [14], distributed along the remaining routes,
with speed limitations.
Thus, in absence of an interoperable European signaling
system like ERTMS, when a train is transiting over international
boundaries, it is necessary to replace locomotives equipped with
different national signaling instrumentations, and/or the cabin
crew, trained to use its national signaling system. Otherwise,
different equipments have to be installed on board, increasing
the construction costs (consider, for instance, the TGV Thalis,
linking Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam, equipped with
seven different signaling systems) and requiring drivers able
to work with all of them.
Taking into account the technology used for the trackside-
onboard communication system three levels of implementation
are provided for ERTMS. ERTMS Level 1 deals with the pre-
existent communication infrastructure and on a discontinuous
communication between trackside and trainborne systems,
based on inductive beacons, the EuroBalises, whereas ERTMS
Level 2 and Level 3 are based on continuous radio communica-
tion. Furthermore ERTMS has defined a secure communication
protocol, EURORADIO [15], that allows secure subsystems
communication based on an open communication network,
like GSM-R [16], [17], in order to support the continuous
communication of ERTMS level 2 and 3. Moreover, in order
to overcome the lack a responsive and flexible train speed
management of ERTMS level 1, due to its discontinuous
communications, EURORADIO integrates this system by
expecting the implementation of a further function, named
RadioInfill. RadioInfill introduces the opportunity of an early
release of the running restriction before the crossing of the
information point associated with this command, when routes
conditions are further exchanged and a train deceleration is no
more necessary. Indeed, as previously explained, in the presence
of beacons, this early release is not enabled and the changes
on speed profile are possible only after the next information
point. As the best of our knowledge, at the time of beginning
of the project none implementation of RadioInfill was available
for commercial trackside communication subsystems.
In this paper a software implementation of the EURORADIO
protocol with the RadioInfill function for trainborne and
trackside subsystems based on ERTMS Level 1 systems
is illustrated. This contribution is innovative since a not
commercial implementation of EURORADIO is not available
and RadioInfill has not been yet implemented. The choice of
using GSM-R as communication network allows to reduce
the impact of the support of this function on costs, risk of
intrusion, temporal railway availability with respect to other
more invasive technological solutions. Moreover, since GSM-R
is the European standard for trackside-onboard communications,
this makes our implementation compliant with any future
evolution of ATP systems. Finally a further key issue of
the presented implementation is the deployment of the Key
Management System, described in Section II, that has made
possible the support of cryptographic functionalities.
The presented software framework is based on a building-
blocks architecture where the different EURORADIO layers
communicates together by means of Application Programm
Interfaces (API) that maintain a common structure along
the stack. This allows a clear and modular implementation.
Furthermore the architecture has been implemented taking into
account security requirements as set by coding software rules
and railway industry requirements specified by CENELEC,
the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization,
through the EN 50128 standard about Software for railway
control and protection systems [18]. EN 50128 standard
describes software safety integrity levels, deeply illustrates
coding rules about objectives, input documents, output doc-
uments and software requirements specification, architecture,
design and implementation, verification and testing as well
as software/hardware integration, software validation, quality
assurance, and maintenance [19]. In particular the SIL4 level
of security has been adopted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II the
ERTMS systems are deeply described, whereas in Section III
the EURORADIO protocol and the RadioInfill function are
illustrated. Section IV presents and analyzes the architecture
developed for EURORADIO protocol with RadioInfill within
the SR-Secure. Moreover some numerical results derived from
the testing phase, and a theoretical analysis of the advantages
from the use of RadioInfill in terms of power saving and travel
time are illustrated. Finally, in Section VI some conclusions
are drawn.
II. ERTMS SYSTEMS
ERTMS is an advanced ATP system introduced both to
enable an interoperable European signaling system and to
overcomes the limits of the discontinuous trackside-onboard
communications in order to make the trains circulation safer
and more efficient. It integrates the pre-existent discontinuous
communication infrastructure by adding some equipments
based on the information points with the goal to make
possible a “continuous" communication, and it is suitable to
provide more data useful for the running train management.
Moreover ERTMS is designed as reference European signaling
system to offers the required level of interoperability to enable
a seamless international traffic circulation across European
national boundaries.
The ERTMS technical platform encompasses on two main
components:
• European Train Control System (ETCS), a signaling,
control and protection system for in-cabin train control,
where a train-based computer, the Eurocab, elaborates the
information sent by the trackside system, compares the
speed curve with the current speed and position and slows
down the train when needed, and
3• Global System for Mobile communication - Railway (GSM-
R) [16], [17], the European standard for trackside-to-
train communication. GSM-R functional specifications
was set by European Integrated Radio Enhanced Network
(EIRENE) project [20] and, then, validated by Mobile
Radio for Railway for Networks in Europe (MORANE)
[21]. GSM-R relies on GSM networks and can manage
data, voice, messages about reliable trains circulations,
and it is set as wide range radio bearer for ETCS.
A third layer, European Traffic Management Layer (ETML),
related to traffic management, is on demonstration phase under
the Europtirails pilot project, on the North-South corridor of
the trans-European network (Rotterdam-Milan route). It aims at
optimizing train movements at operation management level by
means of data about train running, and at improving real-time
train management and route planning, [4].
Main components of the onboard ERTMS command/control
equipment are [22]:
• European Vital Computer (EVC), the onboard computer-
based system that elaborates the information about the
train circulation.
• GSM-R mobile unit for the bidirectional radio commu-
nications between ERTMS trainborne system and Radio
Block Center (RBC) trackside communication.
• Odometry that provides information about train position,
speed and driving direction to the EVC.
• Driver Machine Interface that interfaces the driver with the
EVC, displaying vital information for the train circulation.
• Balise Transmission Module and Train transmission Mod-
ule that pick up the information from Eurobalises and
Euroloop (whose function will be explained below).
Main components of the trackside ERTMS command/control
equipment are:
• Eurobalise, the distributed beacons.
• Euroloop, used for unidirectional semi-continuous trans-
mission from trackside to onboard.
• Lineside Electronic Unit (LEU), the encoders, that connect
Eurobalises and Euroloop to the signaling system.
• RadioInfill Unit (RIU) that is used in ERTMS Level 1
to transfer the information about train direction to the
GSM-R network.
• Trackside radio communication equipments distributed
along the railway line.
• Radio Block Center (RBC) that is a computer-based
system that sends information to the onboard system
taking into account the data received by the interlocking
and ERTMS itself.
• Key Management Center (KMC) that configures and
distributes the key for the GSM-R communications.
ERTMS specifies three implementation levels:
• ERTMS Level 1, see Figure 2, deals with the pre-existent
communication system (ERTMS Level 0) to provide
information to the driver using light signals in order to
modify the train running and/or to brake the train, when
needed. Moreover, inductive beacons (Eurobalise), that
work as information points, are placed in crucial positions
along the route of the train. The trainborne subsystem, the
EVC, keeps and elaborates the cab signaling information;
it can modify the train running only in correspondence of
these points, thus discontinuously. This makes the speed
curve not optimized and the trains circulation not efficient.
The first railway line with ERTMS Level 1 was the
Zaragoza-Huesca Spanish high-speed railway line in 2004.
Figure 2. ERTMS Level 1.
• ERTMS Level 2 and ERTMS Level 3 [10], are digital radio-
based signaling systems based on a RBC that collects
the information sent by the trackside systems, monitors
train movements and continuously sends to the train,
through a GSM-R connection, information about train
positions and directions, permission to proceed or to stop.
These data are displayed in the cab. In this architecture
passive beacons can be used as position train sensors
to correct distance measurements errors. Furthermore
Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) are needed to guarantee
a continuous information exchange as well as some
temperature sensors for axles, bushings and brakes.
In particular, ERTMS Level 3 is based only on radio
communication, and sends its rear end position making
the optimization of circulation easier and reducing the
trackside equipment.
The first railway line with ERTMS Level 2 was the Rome-
Naples high-speed railway line in 2005.
Currently ERTMS Level 2 is diffusing in Europe and several
ERTMS commercial projects are in progress worldwide like
in South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, in Algeria, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Libya. Moreover it is considered for the long-term
integration between Central and Eastern Europe and for the
corridors to Asia and Middle Europe [22].
ERTMS has defined a secure communication protocol,
EURORADIO [15], that allows a secure subsystems com-
munication based on an open communication network, like
GSM-R. EURORADIO will be deeply analyzed on Section III
along with the RadioInfill function and in Section IV, where
the implementation of this protocol, subject of the paper, is
presented.
III. EURORADIO PROTOCOL
In this section a general description of EURORADIO
protocol is provided. It is limited to architectural aspects since a
4Figure 3. Structure of the radio communication system of EURORADIO.
deeper explanation of its structure and its messages handshake
will be illustrated in Section IV, where our implementation of
this protocol is presented.
A. EURORADIO general architecture
The general architecture of ERTMS/ETCS system is derived
from the model illustrated in the Directive EN 50159-2 [23]
about “Railway applications - Communication, signalling
and processing systems - Safety related electronic systems
for signalling” that defines the reference architecture for
safety-related systems based on open transmissions. A safety
system designed in conformity to this model can be used by
application processes to exchange safety-related and non-safety
related information with remote application processes using
the services of the Radio Communication System (RCS).
RCS is part of the Open Transmission System along with the
Open Network (public or railway owned), as established by EN
50129 and depicted in Figure 3. At its turn RCS encompasses
on two components:
• Safety Functional Module (SFM), that encompasses the
functionalities of the safety-related transmission system.
• Communication Functional Module (CFM) that provides
the functions of the communication system based on
circuit switched bearer services of GSM-R PLMN.
EURORADIO, as safety communication protocol, is compliant
with this RCS architecture [15] and in Figure 3 it covers only
the service features requested at the interface to the network.
B. EURORADIO level and interfaces
The EURORADIO protocol level communicates with its
neighboring levels through interfaces.
Referring Figure 4, the lowest level interface, the interface
1, is interposed between RCS and the chosen transmission
medium; it is composed by a user plane, that deals with
Figure 4. Reference architecture of EURORADIO system.
the transferring of user data, and a control plane, that take
care of connection management. This interface is divided into
three different submodules: the on-board GSM PLMN-Interface
1a, the on-board interface 1c between RCS and the mobile
termination (MT), and the interface 1b toward fixed networks
(trackside).
The service interface 2, optional and not required for ERTMS
level 1 RadioInfill unit, interfaces non-safe applications or sup-
port applications and the Communication Functional Module.
Interface 3 is a service interface between safe applications (e.g.
ATP/ATC) and SFM (safety layer). Both these service interfaces
2 and 3 are not mandatory for interoperability and only a
functional definition is provided. The coordinating function
of the CFM covers the OSI layer 4 (Transport layer), layer 3
(Network layer) where performs routing, and layer 2 (Data Link
layer) where can handle GSM-R modems and fixed network.
At the Transport layer the X.224 protocol for connection-
mode transport service [24] is used; it also ensures the
interoperability with remote entities.
The safety services of SFM provide safe connection set-
up, and safe data transfer during the connection lifetime. In
particular, the Safe Service (SaS) user exchanges data with
the SaS provider and the safe data transfer takes care of data
integrity and data authenticity. These safe services are accessed
by means of safe service primitives with their corresponding
parameters at the Safe Service Access Point (SaSAP). These
service primitives are similar to the service primitives defined
in X.224 for connection-mode service. As far as interfaces are
concerned, the service interface between safety layer user and
safety layer, which gives the data flows to/from SFM, is not
mandatory for interoperability.
Finally, SFM reports the errors that occur in the safety layer
and transfers error indications from the lower layers.
5Figure 5. EURORADIO RadioInfill function.
Figure 6. Euroloop.
C. RadioInfill function
As explained in Section I, EURORADIO expects the
implementation of a function, the RadioInfill, in order to
improve the inadequate responsiveness of ERTMS level 1 to
changes in routes and trains circulation conditions. RadioInfill
enables the early release of the braking command when routes
conditions are further exchanged and a train deceleration is no
more necessary, see Figure 5.
Current implementations of RadioInfill function are based on
pre-existent signaling systems or on dedicated components of
trackside system, but no solutions use wireless communication.
For instance, Italian SCMT sends the RadioInfill signal as
coded electric signal along the railway through the track
circuit, used by the anti-collision system like the Italian BACC
braking system. This solution needs an interlocking system
interface and an interference management between neighboring
trains in order to avoid the reception of the message by
not interested trains; furthermore, it is affected by the risk
of intrusion. As far as ERTMS Level 1 is concerned, as
the best or our knowledge, at the present time and without
considering the contribution presented in this paper, RadioInfill
is implemented by means of an electric coil along the railway,
the Euroloop. It is used for a dedicated unidirectional semi-
continuous transmission from trackside to onboard of the same
telegram, that, otherwise, is sent when the train crosses the next
information point, see Figure 6. This makes the cab signaling
almost continuous, but requires the tooling of dedicated and
specific instrumentation, the modification of the information
point structure and the adding of suitable sensors in the
trainborne subsystem. Furthermore it has the same interference
problems than SCMT-based solution.
IV. SR-SECURE PROJECT: THE EURORADIO
IMPLEMENTATION WITH THE RADIOINFILL FUNCTION
In this section the implementation of the EURORADIO
protocol and of the RadioInfill function as part of the SR-
Secure project is illustrated.
The aim of this regional project was to provide a software
implementation of EURORADIO for ERTMS level 1 suitable to
use the GSM-R network with the goal to improve the railways
infrastructure performance in terms of speed, travel time and,
consequently, infrastructure capacity and efficiency. This was
due to the fact that, at the beginning of the project, an open
and not commercial implementation of this communication
protocol was not available. Moreover the further contribution of
our participation to the project innovativeness was the support
of the RadioInfill function. This contribution is particularly
relevant since it was not yet previously implemented by
means of a wireless communication network. As previously
mentioned in Section II, the implementation of RadioInfill
allows the introduction of a continuous communication between
the Information Point and the on-board equipment, avoiding
architectural and technological solutions invasive for the pre-
existent signaling system, see Euroloop. In particular, the choice
of GSM-R was forced by the fact that it is set as European
standard for the trackside-onboard communication suitable for
voice, data and information about signaling and train circulation
management. It allows to reduce the impact of the RadioInfill
implementation on costs, temporal availability of the railway,
and risk of intrusion with respect to the solutions based on
SCMT and Euroloop described in Section II. Moreover its
diffusion in Europe is a guarantee for the support of the
signaling communications in general, and for RadioInfill in
particular. Finally, this choice is expected to be compliant with
any further evolution of ATP systems.
Furthermore, the deployment of the Key Management System
of EURORADIO, described in Section II, that has made
possible the support of cryptographic functionalities suitable
to protect the system from external intrusions, was another key
point of the project.
In the following the description of the structure of the
proposed framework and of its interfaces is presented, as well
as the explanation of the coding rules and of the adopted Safety
Integrity Level in order to fulfill the requirements of the railway
vital system. Furthermore the testing strategies used to validate
the proposed EURORADIO implementation will be illustrated.
Finally, a theoretical study suitable to highlight the positive
impact of the RadioInfill function implementation on the trains
power consumption and on the travel time, due to the avoiding
of unnecessary breaking, will be deeply explained.
A. Analysis of the impact of RadioInfill on energy consumption
and travel time
The integration of the RadioInfill function in ERTMS level 1,
as well as on SSC and SCMT systems, increases the security
and efficiency of the train control systems. Indeed, as explained
in Section III, the “early release" of the breaking command,
enabled by RadioInfill avoids unnecessary modifications of the
speed curve, and improves the reactivity of the systems It is
intuitive to deduce that this optimization on trains circulations
positively impacts on the comfort of the passengers, that are
no more stressed by stop-and-go running of the train. But
further results suitable to highlight the advantages of RadioInfill
about power consumption and travel time can be derived
mathematically.
6a) Assumptions: The analysis is based on a simplified
model of the motion of the train. It is assumed that energy
necessary to move the train along the selected route has
essentially two components:
• the energy Ev required to increase the speed, essentially
due to the mass of the train, and
• the energy Ea required to compensate the air friction, that
is dependent primarily on the speed of the train.
b) Scenario: The chosen scenario suitable to compare
the behavior of the system with and without the RadioInfill
function is based on the following acceleration-deceleration
profile :
• the trains starts accelerating from 0 Km/h to a speed line
of 150 km/h.
• the line speed is maintained until a certain distance;
• as a consequence of a yellow advise signal the train
decelerates to 30 Km/h;
• after the protection signal the train accelerates again until
150 km/h;
• the train maintains the speed line and then decelerates
until 0 km/h at a distance of 100 Km.
In particular, the study considers also the situation without
intermediate deceleration and deceleration, i.e. when the the
protection signal commutes to the green light immediately after
the train crossed the advise beacon and the RadioInfill allows
the early release of the breaking command. In this case the line
speed of 150 Km/h is maintained along the route. Moreover,
in order to investigate how the acceleration-deceleration affect
the power consumption in dependency of the mass of the train,
two types of trains are considered, a passenger train with a
mass of 200 tons, and a freight train with a mass of 1500 tons.
c) Hypotheses: Some hypotheses are assumed in order
to simplify the analysis, without any impact on the study:
• the motion of the train is along a straight track; con-
sequently only the kinetic energy varies, whereas the
potential energy is unchanged.
• The acceleration (equal to 0.3 m/s2, value derived from
experience) is constant in absolute value, both during the
acceleration and the deceleration.
• The motor efficiency and various energy losses such as
mechanical and rolling frictions, that affects both the
considered energy components but not their ratio, are not
included.
• Even if a speed line of 150 Km/h is high for a freight
train, the choice of an unique value for both the type of
trains is due to homogeneity motivations and does not
invalidate the meaning of the results.
d) Results: The energy Ev required to speed up the train
is obtained by the difference between the final and the initial
kinetic energy, and it is equal to:
Ev =
1
2
m(v22 − v21) (1)
where v2 and v1 are the final and initial speed during the
acceleration phase.
The energy Ea required to compensate the air friction is
obtained by the product of the resisting force Fa and the
distance along which it is applied. Fa is expressed by the
following equation:
Fa =
1
2
Cx · ρ · S · v2 (2)
where Cx is the dimensionless coefficient of resistance; a value
of 1.8 for the passenger train and roughly twice for the freight
train are derived from the literature; ρ is the air density, equal
to 1.2Kg/m3 at sea level and at a temperature of 20◦ Celsius
degrees; finally S is the front section of the train set to 10m2
for both the considered types of trains. The numerical results
are summarized in Table I.
It is possible to infer from the results that the main energy
component is Ea, due to the air friction. This elements is yet
more prominent when RadioInfill is not used, since in this
case the effective distance traveled at the maximum speed is
greater. However the absence of deceleration-acceleration can
compensate this effect since in this case there is not energy
consumption due to the acceleration. Thus it is possible to
conclude that, by the use of RadioInfill, also saving only one
braking, along a route of 100 Km it is possible to obtain a power
saving equal to 4% and 18% respectively with a passenger
train and a freight train. As far as the travel time is concerned,
it is possible derive a reduction from 43.8’ to 42.3’ for both
the trains due to the constant acceleration. Since these results
are obtained in ideal traffic conditions, it is possible to deduce
from the experience that, in situation with high density traffic
and complex routes instrumentation, and where the number
of unnecessary braking can arise to 5 along 100 Km, the
advantages about power saving and travel time can be still
higher.
B. Software architecture
EURORADIO is composed of different layers that can
be implemented through a stack of different software layers
communicating with each other, as specified by its Functional
Interface Specification (FIS) [15].
The EURORADIO software stack is illustrated in Fig. 7.
The layers form a hierarchy of functionalities starting with
the physical hardware components (Modem GSM-R) to the
user interfaces at the software application level (RadioInfill Ap-
plication). In particular, the RadioInfill has been implemented
at the Application Layer.
Following a modular approach, each layer receives infor-
mation from the layer above, and processes and transfers that
to the layer below. Each layer adds its own encapsulation
information (header) to the incoming information before it is
passed to the lower layer.
C. The Safety Layer
When the application level want to send a RadioInfill
message to another remote entity it prepares a Safe Protocol
Data Unit (SaPDU) and sends that inside a Safe Software
Data Unit (SaSDU) to the contiguous lower level. The Safety
Layer process this message and then sends that to the Transport
Layer. At the same time the Safety Layer process the messages
incoming from the lower level and forward the results back to
the connected application.
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Pas. 1.8 2 ∗ 105 95 478 572 48 499 548 25 (4%)
Fr. 3.6 1.5 ∗ 106 710 956 1665 362 999 1361 305 (18%)
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Figure 7. EURORADIO developed layers.
Figure 8. EURORADIO model of communication service.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 8.
The Safety Layer API is composed by the following
interfaces:
void SaApiInit(const SaInit_t* init);
it must be called before requesting the scheduler to
initialize data structures;
void SaApiRun(void);
it has to be called every task cycle to run: it moves
messages from the Safety to Transport layer and back;
bool_t SaApiPutMsg(uint8_t msg);
it lets the application to enqueue a SDU to be
processed by the Safe layer; it returns false if
the queue if full;
uint32_t SaApiGetNumMsg(void);
it returns the number of messages queued at the Safety
layer available for the application;
bool_t SaApiGetMsg(uint8_t msg);
it lets to read the next message available in the queue;
it returns false if there no messages.
The SaApiRun(void) behaviour is well illustrated by the
following pseudo-code:
1 void SaApiRun(void) {
SaTrMsgs = SaTrGetNumMsgs();
3 while ( SaTrMsgs > 0 ){
SaTrGetMsg(msg)
5 TrApiPutMsg(msg)
SaTrMsgs--;
7 }
TrApiRun();
9 TrSaMsgs = TrApiGetNumMsg();
while ( TrSaMsgs > 0 ) {
11 TrApiGetMsg(msg)
SaPutTrMsg(msg)
13 TrSaMsgs--;
}
15 }
Listing 1. Example of Safety Layer API: SaApiRun
The format of message varies depending on the primitive
sent to the layer. The Safety Layer can accept the following
primitives:
• Sa-CONNECT.request,
• Sa-CONNECT.indication,
• Sa-CONNECT.response,
• Sa-CONNECT.confirmation,
• Sa-DATA.request,
• Sa-DATA.indication,
• Sa-DATA.confirmation,
• Sa-HP-DATA.request,
• Sa-HP-DATA.confirmation,
8• Sa-DISCONNECT.request,
• Sa-DISCONNECT.indication and
• Sa-REPORT.indication.
Each primitive is composed by different fields of information.
For instance SA-CONNECT.request and Sa-DATA.request are
defined as follows:
1 typedef struct _Sa_CONN_req_MSG {
uint8_t MsgID; / / message t y p e Id .
3 uint8_t AddressType; / / Network a d d r e s s or
Mobi le phone .
uint8_t Address[ADDRESS_SIZE];
5 uint8_t CalledETCSIDType;
uint8_t CalledETCSID[ETCSID_SIZE];
7 uint8_t CallingETCSIDType;
uint8_t CallingETCSID[ETCSID_SIZE]
9 uint8_t ApplicationType;
uint8_t QoS; / / !< QoS l e v e l
11 } Sa_CONN_req_MSG_t;
13 typedef struct _Sa_DATA_req_MSG {
uint8_t MsgID; / / message t y p e Id .
15 uint8_t SaCEPID; / / S a f e t y l a y e r C o n n e c t i o n
I d e n t i f i e r .
uint8_t UserDataSize[2];
17 uint8_t UserData[MAX_AppPDU_SIZE];
} Sa_DATA_req_MSG_t;
Listing 2. Example of Safety Messages
1) The Key Management System: As mentioned in Section II,
one of the components of the trackside ERTMS subsystem
is the Key Management Center (KMC) that configures and
distributes the key for the GSM-R communications. Indeed,
since the exchange of the signaling telegrams is subject
to strict security constraints, in order to prevent dangerous
external intrusions and to avoid that a not interested train
receives a message with a different destination, the adoption
of some cryptographic functionalities is required when a GSM-
R connection is established. In EURORADIO protocol stack,
inside the Safety Layer, it is expected the implementation of
Key Management System that deals with the correct exchange
of symmetric cryptographic keys required during the creation
and authentication phases of the radio sessions. The creation
of these keys and their exchange are based on the well-
known Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption standard,
proposed by IBM and standardized by the Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS), now named National Bureau of
Standards, in 1977 as FIPS PUB 46 [25]. In this block cypher,
a block of fixed length equal to 64 bits is modified into a
ciphertext bitstring of the same length by the use of a key of
64 bits. However, since only 56 bits of the key are effectively
used, whereas the 8 bits are used for parity check, the effective
length of the key is 56 bits.
D. The Transport Layer
The Transport layer setups a transport connection, if it is
not yet established, sending a Connection-Request Transport
Protocol Data Unit (TDPU) to the Network layer. When the
connection is up it can propagate the SaPDU encapsulated in
Data-TPDU (DT-TPDU). Each TPDU is sent using a Transport
Service Data Unit (TSDU) to the Network layer. Moreover
the Transport layer receives the TSDU incoming from the
underlying Network layer.
The Transport Layer API is composed by the following
functions:
• TrApiInit,
• TrApiRun,
• TrApiPutMsg,
• TrApiGetNumMsg, and
• TrApiGetMsg.
Their functions is similar to the function provided by the Safety
layer API.
E. The Network Layer
The Network layer usually has just two functions:
• it opens/closes the modem using the modem API interface
for GSM-07.07 layer;
• it sends/receives Network PDU (NPDU) to/from the Data
Link Layer.
The Network layer API is composed by the following
interfaces:
• NwApiInit,
• NwApiRun,
• NwApiPutMsg,
• NwApiGetNumMsg, and
• NwApiGetMsg.
Thanks to the adopted modularity, their functions is similar to
the function provided by the Safety layer API.
F. The Data Link Layer
The Data Link layer API exports the following interfaces:
• DLApiInit,
• DLApiRun,
• DLApiPutMsg,
• DLApiGetNumMsg, and
• DLApiGetMsg.
As with the previous layer, their functions is similar to the
function provided by the Safety layer API.
G. The Physical Layer
The GSM modem API exports the following interfaces:
• GSMApiInit,
• GSMApiPutMsg,
• GSMApiGetNumMsg,
• GSMApiGetMsg,
• GSMModemApiRun,
• GSMModemApiPutMsg,
• GSMModemApiGetNumMsg, and
• GSMModemApiGetMsg.
While the GSMApi functions are used to transfer data to/from
the GSM layer, the GSMModemApi functions interact directly
with the attached GSM-R modem.
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Figure 9. Test of a single layer.
H. Implementation notes
The EURORADIO software has been developed using
opensource tools, and has been compiled under different
Operating Systems such as Windows, Linux and FreeBSD
to ensure portability between different platforms.
Furthermore the initial implementation of the EURORADIO
protocol on an host machine has taken into account the
subsequent code migration on the targets of the onboard
and trackside communications equipments. Indeed, they have
limited computation capacity and memory, in particular the
trackside equipment. Hence, in order to maintain the same
performance, the software has been developed by subdividing
the code into small functions (NB mettere la lunghezza
massima): this limits the expansion of the stack.
Moreover, since the railways signaling system is a vital
system, the software development has to follow strict design
and programming rules set by the Safety Policy as stated by the
CEI EN 50128. In particular, the Safety Policy adopted is based
on the Safety Integrity Level 4 (SIL4), the higher, that has to
be fulfilled by all the functions in order to ensure the needed
level of security and a safe and robust behavior of the system.
The SIL4 enforces the adoption of clear and precise coding
techniques to avoid unpredictable system behavior due to the
use of different hardware platforms. Indeed, special instruction
like cycles, conditional instructions (case, switch, etc.), or
an ambiguous use of global, private and local variables (defini-
tions, names, etc.), structures, pointers,preprocessor directives,
macros, the definitions of functions etc., depending on the
hardware where the software is running, can produce different
system behaviors and performances. This can negatively impact
on the system predictability and security, that are crucial
features of a vital system. Thus the use of the standard C
and the respect of the strict coding rules of CEI EN 50128
allow to ensure both portability and a predicable and safe
behavior of the software architecture. Furthermore, the use of
the basic data type of C have been avoided since different
hardware platforms can assign diverse lengths. In order to have
unambiguous data types, fixed length data types have been
expressly defined.
V. SR-SECURE SOFTWARE TESTING AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
Each software layer has been tested by using a computer-
based simulator. Each software layer has been tested isolated,
see Figure 9, and together with the other layers, see Figure 10.
In this way find programming and logical errors has been easier.
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Figure 10. Test of multiple layers.
Moreover the overall EURORADIO stack has been validated
using the tests illustrated in Subset092 suitable to check the
conformity of the whole software.
Then the RadioInfill application and the EURORADIO
protocol stack have been uploaded on a real embedded system
adopted in production, where these tests have been replicated.
Finally the software has been validated by an external agency
(Italcertifer) specialized on Train Systems.
A. Performance evaluation in emulated environment
A stress test had been set to check how many Safety
primitives can be issued per seconds, after a connection has
been established. This test is composed by the following phases:
1) Safe connection, composed by modem dialing, network
and transport connection;
2) Safe data transmission of a payload of a variable length;
3) Safe disconnection.
The payload length varies from 1 to 1023 byte (that is the
longest EURORADIO user data message).
We check that each transmitted Sa-DATA.request is correctly
received. If any error happens, due to dropped packets at any
layer, the Sa-DATA packet loss count is incremented.
It is assumed to operate in ideal conditions, with no errors
due to the medium. The presented results have been obtained by
simulating independent replications until the 95% confidence
interval is reached for each measure.
Fig. 11 shows that the packet loss is decreasing when Sa-
DATA.request Interarrival time increases, as expected in a real
system.
Then a Sa-DATA.request Interarrival time equal to 500 ms
is set in order to check if the packets loss is affected by
the Scheduler Tic Time. The Scheduler Tic Time is the time
elapsing between two calls of the EURORADIO protocol
stack. A lower Scheduler Tic Time means that SaApiRun()
will be called more often by the EURORADIO application.
It is possible to tune this parameter, whose lower limit is
depending by the hardware and the kernel used. If the value of
this parameter is too low the EURORADIO stack will consume
more CPU time, whereas if it is too high the EURORADIO
stack could miss more packets coming from the network.
Fig. 12 highlights that the packets loss is decreasing when
the Scheduler Tic Time increases.
Both these results, obtained by means of the presented
software implementation of EURORADIO in an emulated
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environment, confirms the good behavior of the ystem suitable
to reproduce real communication network phenomena.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is set
by European Union as the reference for interoperable signaling
systems and a safe and optimized railway traffic management.
It aims to allow European trains cross national borders without
replace locomotives equipped with national cab signaling
systems and/or drivers. It defines a safe communication
protocol, Euroradio, based on an open communication network
like GSM-R. Euroradio is used to safely exchange data about
trains circulation between trackside and trainborne equipments.
Its RadioInfill function is suitable to avoid unnecessary braking,
whose advantages in terms of power saving and travel time
have been analyzed.
In this paper a software implementation of the Euroradio
protocol for ERTMS Level 1 systems designed for the SR-
Secure Italian project is illustrated. The implementation is
based on a building-blocks architecture where the Euroradio
layers communicates together through Application Programm
Interfaces. Security coding rules and railway industry require-
ments specified by EN 50128 standard have been respected.
The proposed implementation has successfully passed con-
formity tests and has been tested on a computer-based simulator.
Finally the results obtained in an emulated environment
confirms the good behavior of the system suitable to reproduce
real communication network phenomena.
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